Should we replace knowledge by understanding? — A comment on Elgin and Goodman's reconception of epistemology
Synthese 95 (1):119 - 128 (1993)
|Abstract||Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or its supplement. I show that these are three very different options. While agreeing with the view that there may be good reasons for some revisions and supplements, I strongly disagree with Elgin and Goodman's replacement thesis.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Catherine Z. Elgin, Israel Scheffler & Robert Schwartz (1999). Nelson Goodman 1906-1998. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5):206 - 208.
Wolfgang Künne (1993). Truth, Rightness, and Permanent Acceptability. Synthese 95 (1):107 - 117.
Catherine Z. Elgin (1997). Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary. Cornell University Press.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):1-18.
Catherine Z. Elgin & Nelson Goodman (1987). Changing the Subject. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46:219-223.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2001). The Legacy of Nelson Goodman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):679-690.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2000). In Memoriam: Nelson Goodman. Erkenntnis 52 (2):149 -.
Mark Textor (2008). Samples as Symbols. Ratio 21 (3):344-359.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #47,624 of 549,069 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )
How can I increase my downloads?