Philosophy East and West 52 (2):224-245 (2002)
|Abstract||The Euro-American philosophical traditions offer two extreme positions to the problem of identity over time: G. W. Leibniz' essentialism and Derek Parfit's reductionism. A third alternative conception of personal identity is presented here, more appropriately named personal nonduality, which is based on Nishida Kitarō's conception of personal unity as nonrelative contradictory self-identity|
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