David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189 (2011)
Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism.
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Indrek Reiland (2015). Experience, Seemings, and Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):510-534.
Elijah Chudnoff & David Didomenico (2015). The Epistemic Unity of Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):535-549.
David Sosa (2015). What Does It Matter What It's Like? Philosophical Issues 25 (1):224-242.
Berit Brogaard & Bartek Chomanski (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486.
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
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