Comment on Nick Bostrom's 'the doomsday argument is alive and kicking'
Mind 108 (431):551-553 (1999)
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Nick Bostrom (2001). The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe. Synthese 127 (3):359 - 387.
Bradley Monton (2003). The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):79–82.
Nick Bostrom & Milan M. Cirković (2003). The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83–91.
D. J. Bradley (2005). No Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank: A Defense of Bostrom. Synthese 144 (1):91 - 100.
Alasdair M. Richmond (2008). Doomsday, Bishop Ussher and Simulated Worlds. Ratio 21 (2):201–217.
N. Bostrom (1999). The Doomsday Argument is Alive and Kicking. Mind 108 (431):539-551.
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