David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (2):242-264 (2009)
Virtually everyone agrees that, even after having presented the arguments for their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories are required to provide some sort of account of the conflict between their theories and what the folk believe. I examine various strategies for answering the challenge from folk belief. The examination proceeds as a case study, whose focus is eliminativism about ordinary material objects. I critically assess eliminativist attempts to explain folk belief by appeal to paraphrase, experience, and intuition.
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2015). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
David Rose (2015). Persistence Through Function Preservation. Synthese 192 (1):97-146.
Daniel Z. Korman (2015). Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room. Noûs 49 (2):298-321.
Robert Carry Osborne (forthcoming). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
Gabriele Contessa (2014). One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):199-221.
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