David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376 (1993)
This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desire, which nevertheless makes these imperatives universal. The account is contrasted with some recent work of Stephen Stich.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
William G. Lycan (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin Goldman (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Lorraine Code (1987). Epistemic Responsibility. Published for Brown University Press by University Press of New England.
Citations of this work BETA
Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Selim Berker (2013). The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
Alex Worsnip (2016). Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
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