Epistemic normativity

Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376 (1993)
This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desire, which nevertheless makes these imperatives universal. The account is contrasted with some recent work of Stephen Stich.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064485
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Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.

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