Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):649–657 (2005)
|Abstract||The counterintuitive implications of law necessitarianism pose a far more serious threat than its proponents recognize. Law necessitarians are committed to scientific essentialism, the thesis that there are metaphysically necessary truths which can be known only a posteriori. The most frequently cited arguments for this position rely on modal intuitions. Rejection of intuition thus threatens to undermine it. I consider ways in which law necessitarians might try to defend scientific essentialism without invoking intuition. I then consider ways in which law necessitarians who accept the general reliability of intuition might try to explain away the intuitions which conflict with their theory.|
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