David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):251-264 (2010)
The relationship between metacognition and mindreading was investigated by comparing the monitoring of one’s own learning and another person’s learning . Previous studies indicated that in self-paced study judgments of learning for oneself are inversely related to the amount of study time invested in each item. This suggested reliance on the memorizing-effort heuristic that shorter ST is diagnostic of better recall. In this study although an inverse ST–JOL relationship was observed for Self, it was found for Other only when the Other condition followed the Self condition. The results were interpreted in terms of the proposal that the processes underlying experience-based metacognitive judgments are largely unconscious. However, participants can derive insight from observing themselves as they monitor their own learning, and transfer that insight to Other, thus exhibiting a shift from experience-based to theory-based judgments. Although different processes mediate metacognition and mindreading, metacognition can inform mindreading
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Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian (2012). Metacognition and Endorsement. Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2011). Two Levels of Metacognition. Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.
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Anna Loussouarn, Damien Gabriel & Joëlle Proust (2011). Exploring the Informational Sources of Metaperception: The Case of Change Blindness Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1489-1501.
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