Skepticism about practical reason

Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25 (1986)
Abstract
Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force.
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DOI 10.2307/2026464
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Nicholas Southwood & Lina Eriksson (2011). Norms and Conventions. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):195 - 217.
Nick Zangwill (2008). The Indifference Argument. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):91 - 124.

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