David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 73 (1):27 - 41 (1987)
This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic.
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Reid (2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
John Stuart Mill (1999). On Liberty. Broadview Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Martin Kusch & Peter Lipton (2002). Testimony: A Primer. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):209-217.
Martin Kusch (2002). Testimony in Communitarian Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):335-354.
Lisa A. Bergin (2001). The Role of Truth When Communicating Knowledge Across Epistemic Difference. Social Epistemology 15 (4):367 – 378.
Jane Duran (2003). Feminist Epistemology and Social Epistemics. Social Epistemology 17 (1):45 – 54.
Catherine Hundleby (2002). The Open End: Social Naturalism, Feminist Values and the Integrity of Epistemology. Social Epistemology 16 (3):251 – 265.
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