Some social features of cognition

Synthese 73 (1):27 - 41 (1987)
Abstract
This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic.
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References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1985). Fodor's Holism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):15-16.

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Citations of this work BETA
Martin Kusch & Peter Lipton (2002). Testimony: A Primer. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):209-217.
Martin Kusch (2002). Testimony in Communitarian Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):335-354.
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