Mind and Language 21 (2):166–186 (2006)
|Abstract||Gricean pragmatics seems to pose a dilemma. If semantics is limited to the conventional meanings of types of expressions, then the semantics of an utterance does not determine what is said. If all that figures in the determination of what is said counts as semantics, then pragmatic reasoning about the specific intentions of a speaker intrudes on semantics. The dilemma is false. Key points: Semantics need not determine what is said, and the description, with which the hearer begins, need not provide the hearer with knowledge of what was said, or the ability to express what was said, from the hearer's context.|
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