The Normativity of Instrumental Reason
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1997)
This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. Unless there are normative principles directing us to the adoption of certain ends, there can be no requirement to take the means to our ends. The familiar view that the instrumental principle is the only requirement of practical reason is incoherent.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.
Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.
Similar books and articles
Michael Byron (1998). Satisficing and Optimality. Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
Stephen Finlay (2010). Against All Reason? : Scepticism About the Instrumental Norm. In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.
Stephanie Beardman (2007). The Special Status of Instrumental Reasons. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.
R. Jay Wallace (2001). Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (4):1-26.
Markos Valaris (2012). Instrumental Rationality. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.
John Brunero (2005). Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):557 - 569.
Kieran Setiya (2007). Cognitivism About Instrumental Reason. Ethics 117 (4):649-673.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Stephen Finlay (2009). Against All Reason? Skepticism About the Instrumental Norm. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave MacMillan.
Added to index2009-09-19
Total downloads372 ( #610 of 1,101,772 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #178,613 of 1,101,772 )
How can I increase my downloads?