Genericity and logical form
Mind and Language 14 (4):441–467 (1999)
| Abstract | In this paper I propose a novel treatment of generic sentences, which proceeds by means of different levels of analysis. According to this account, all generic sentences (I-generics and D-generics alike) are initially treated in a uniform manner, as involving higher-order predication (following the work of George Boolos, James Higginbotham and Barry Schein on plurals). Their non-uniform character, however, re-emerges at subsequent levels of analysis, when the higher-order predications of the first level are cashed out in terms of quantification over individuals: this last step, I suggest, involves knowledge concerning the lexical meaning of the predicates in question. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAndrei Cimpian, Amanda C. Brandone & Susan A. Gelman (2010). Generic Statements Require Little Evidence for Acceptance but Have Powerful Implications. Cognitive Science 34 (8):1452-1482.
Friederike Moltmann (2012). Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content. Synthese 184 (2):157-177.
Sebastian Löbner (2000). Polarity in Natural Language: Predication, Quantification and Negation in Particular and Characterizing Sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (3):213-308.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads29 ( #43,097 of 556,769 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,999 of 556,769 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
