David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 14 (4):441–467 (1999)
In this paper I propose a novel treatment of generic sentences, which proceeds by means of different levels of analysis. According to this account, all generic sentences (I-generics and D-generics alike) are initially treated in a uniform manner, as involving higher-order predication (following the work of George Boolos, James Higginbotham and Barry Schein on plurals). Their non-uniform character, however, re-emerges at subsequent levels of analysis, when the higher-order predications of the first level are cashed out in terms of quantification over individuals: this last step, I suggest, involves knowledge concerning the lexical meaning of the predicates in question.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Liebesman (2011). Simple Generics. Noûs 45 (3):409-442.
Berit Brogaard (2007). Sharvy's Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):160–180.
Berit Brogaard (2007). The but Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite Descriptions. Mind and Language 22 (4):402–426.
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