Seemingly Similar Beliefs: A Case Study on Relativistic Research Practices

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):84-110 (2011)
The kind of epistemic relativism usually refuted by its critics is less frequently observable in ethnographic research practices than the critics assume. Instead, methodological conceptual relativism can be recognized in several cases. This has significant practical implications, since the kind of epistemic relativism described by its critics, if rigorously followed, could lead to ethnographers conflating ways of argumentation accepted by their informants, with ways of argumentation accepted in academia, whereas methodological conceptual relativism does not have such consequences
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DOI 10.1177/0048393110387882
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