Education and “thick” epistemology

Educational Theory 61 (5):549-564 (2011)
Abstract
In this essay Ben Kotzee addresses the implications of Bernard Williams's distinction between “thick” and “thin” concepts in ethics for epistemology and for education. Kotzee holds that, as in the case of ethics, one may distinguish between “thick” and “thin” concepts of epistemology and, further, that this distinction points to the importance of the study of the intellectual virtues in epistemology. Following Harvey Siegel, Kotzee contends that “educated” is a thick epistemic concept, and he explores the consequences of this for the subjects of epistemology and philosophy of education. Ultimately, Kotzee argues that its nature as a “thick” concept makes education suited to play an important role in explaining how the intellectual virtues can be acquired
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Citations of this work BETA
Duncan Pritchard (2013). Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):236-247.
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