Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):825-839 (2012)
|Abstract||Most philosophers accept some version of the requirement of total evidence (RTE), which tells us to always update on our complete evidence, which often includes ‘background information’ about how that evidence was collected. But different philosophers disagree about how to implement that requirement. In this article, I argue against one natural picture of how to implement the RTE in likelihood arguments, and I argue in favor of a different picture. I also apply my picture to the controversy over the so-called ‘Objection from Anthropic Bias’ to the fine-tuning argument, and argue that the Objection from Anthropic Bias fails|
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