Silins's Liberalism

Philosophical Studies 159 (1):61-68 (2012)
Abstract
Nico Silins has proposed and defended a form of Liberalism about perception that, he thinks, is a good compromise between the Dogmatism of Jim Pryor and others, and the Conservatism of Roger White, Crispin Wright, and others. In particular, Silins argues that his theory can explain why having justification to believe the negation of skeptical hypotheses is a necessary condition for having justification to believe ordinary propositions, even though (contra the Conservative) the latter is not had in virtue of the former. I argue that Silins's explanation is unsuccessful, and hence that we should prefer either White/Wright-style Conservatism (which can explain this necessary condition) or Pryor-style Dogmatism (which denies that this is a necessary condition).
Keywords Liberalism about perception  Conservatism about perception  Dogmatism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,337
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 216-236.
Thomas Kelly (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. 183--217.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jeffrey Dunn (2012). Evidential Externalism. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.
Eunjin Lee (2008). Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.
Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.
Rutger Claassen (2011). The Conservative Challenge to Liberalism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (4):465-485.
Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-01

Total downloads

72 ( #18,389 of 1,096,616 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #51,759 of 1,096,616 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.