Two Notions of Utterance Meaning

Abstract
Two alternatives are considered: (1) the notion of utterance meaning as constituted by the match between the communicative intention and interpretation, (2) the notion of utterance meaning as a set of the utterance's normative consequences. (1) is criticised for its being based on a notion of communicative success limited to a certain type of discourse. On the contrary, (2) allows for a variety of types of discourse governed by different principles of the determination of utterance meanings: they differ in particular in the role assigned to linguistic conventions and to hypotheses about speaker's intentions. A special kind of these hypotheses which can be relevant within both accounts of utterance meaning is analysed in detail.
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