Beliefs, Desires, and... 'Besires'

Philosophical Inquiry 30 (1-2):177-189 (2008)
Abstract
Whether rationalism when concerned with explanations of moral motivation should stand in opposition to the relevant Humean approach is a perplexing question that is oversimplified when reduced to a rationalism vs. Humeanism clear cut opposition about the possibility of rational control over desires.This paper criticizes the significance of this simplification as well as the hypothesis of unitary psychological states constituted by beliefs and desires (referred to as 'besires') and their alleged capacity to secure rational control over desires. Besires contribute in the explanation of moral motivation only indirectly, that is, not as permanent unitary psychological states but only as relatively very short-term 'backgrounds' to subsequently detached matured desires.This interpretation further explored shows that the rational demandfor a genuine rational control over desires presupposes rather than opposing to the Humean belief desire distinctness - the latter actually securing the possibility of genuine moral incoherence as long as we intend to understand it neither as irrationality, nor as psychological deficiency
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Steven E. Swartzer (2011). Doing Without Desiring. Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    Christopher G. Framarin (2008). Motivation-Encompassing Attitudes. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):121 – 130.
    Donald C. Hubin (1991). Irrational Desires. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
    Jessica Moss (2006). Pleasure and Illusion in Plato. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535.
    Patrick Fleming (2008). On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:143-162.
    Alex Gregory (2012). Changing Direction on Direction of Fit. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.
    Dennis Loughrey (1998). Second-Order Desire Accounts of Autonomy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):211 – 229.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-09-18

    Total downloads

    2 ( #258,346 of 1,089,049 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,801 of 1,089,049 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.