David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Inquiry 30 (1-2):177-189 (2008)
Whether rationalism when concerned with explanations of moral motivation should stand in opposition to the relevant Humean approach is a perplexing question that is oversimplified when reduced to a rationalism vs. Humeanism clear cut opposition about the possibility of rational control over desires.This paper criticizes the significance of this simplification as well as the hypothesis of unitary psychological states constituted by beliefs and desires (referred to as 'besires') and their alleged capacity to secure rational control over desires. Besires contribute in the explanation of moral motivation only indirectly, that is, not as permanent unitary psychological states but only as relatively very short-term 'backgrounds' to subsequently detached matured desires.This interpretation further explored shows that the rational demandfor a genuine rational control over desires presupposes rather than opposing to the Humean belief desire distinctness - the latter actually securing the possibility of genuine moral incoherence as long as we intend to understand it neither as irrationality, nor as psychological deficiency
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Steven Swartzer (2013). Appetitive Besires and the Fuss About Fit. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988.
Steven E. Swartzer (2011). Doing Without Desiring. Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Mark van Roojen (2002). Should Motivational Humeans Be Humeans About Rationality? Topoi 21 (1-2):209-215.
Stephen P. Stich (1985). Could Man Be an Irrational Animal? Synthese 64 (1):115-35.
Christopher G. Framarin (2008). Motivation-Encompassing Attitudes. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):121 – 130.
Donald C. Hubin (1991). Irrational Desires. Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
Jessica Moss (2006). Pleasure and Illusion in Plato. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535.
Patrick Fleming (2008). On a Purported Principle of Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:143-162.
Jonas Olson (2002). Are Desires de Dicto Fetishistic? Inquiry 45 (1):89 – 96.
Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
Chase Wrenn (2010). A Puzzle About Desire. Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
Alex Gregory (2012). Changing Direction on Direction of Fit. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.
Dennis Loughrey (1998). Second-Order Desire Accounts of Autonomy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):211 – 229.
Patrick Yarnell (2002). Humean Instrumentalism and the Motivational Capacity of Reason. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:499-509.
Added to index2012-09-18
Total downloads3 ( #303,566 of 1,099,745 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #303,379 of 1,099,745 )
How can I increase my downloads?