Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 75 (5):767-778 (2008)
|Abstract||Among philosophers of science nearly a century ago the dominant attitude was that (in Rudolph Carnap’s words) philosophy of science was “like science itself, neutral with respect to practical aims, whether they are moral aims for the individual, or political aims for a society.” The dominant attitude today is not much different: our aim is still to articulate scientific rationality, and our understanding of that rationality still excludes the moral and political. I contrast this with the growing entanglements within the sciences of the ethical and the epistemic, and I suggest ways in which philosophers of science can usefully respond. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 100 Malloy Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556; e‐mail: email@example.com.|
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