David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Epistemology 20 (1):105 – 115 (2006)
Believing is not much like premeditated intentional action, but neither is it completely reflexive. If we had no more control over believing than we have over our automatic reflexes, it would be hard to make sense of the idea of epistemic virtues. There is, after all, no excellence of the eye blink or the knee jerk. If there are epistemic virtues, then our degree of voluntary control over believing must lie somewhere between the extremes of what we experience with passive reflexes and intentional actions. Believing is not the only human activity that lies between these extremes. A number of behaviors and bodily processes do. Using some of these as a model, I will give an account of the nature of our voluntary control over believing and argue that it is necessary to ground the conviction that epistemic virtues do make sense.
|Keywords||action, belief, epistemology, VIRTUE epistemology, voluntarism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
B. Williams (1973). Deciding to Believe. In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press 136--51.
William Alston (1992). Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
Nishi Shah (2002). Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism. The Monist 85 (3):436-445.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jason Kawall (2002). Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues. Ratio 15 (3):257–275.
Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2006). Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):1--8.
Scott F. Aikin & J. Caleb Clanton (2010). Developing Group-Deliberative Virtues. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (4):409-424.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Evaluating Need for Cognition: A Case Study in Naturalistic Epistemic Virtue Theory. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):227 – 245.
Charles Taliaferro (2001). The Virtues of Embodiment. Philosophy 76 (1):111-125.
Steven L. Reynolds (2011). Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations. Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
Nenad Miscevic (2007). Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology). Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Collective Epistemic Virtues. Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #112,402 of 1,725,176 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,103 of 1,725,176 )
How can I increase my downloads?