David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169 (2008)
Gödel's philosophical views were to a significant extent influenced by the study not only of Leibniz or Husserl, but also of Kant. Both Gödel and Kant aimed at the secure foundation of philosophy, the certainty of knowledge and the solvability of all meaningful problems in philosophy. In this paper, parallelisms between the foundational crisis of metaphysics in Kant's view and the foundational crisis of mathematics in Gödel's view are elaborated, especially regarding the problem of finding the “secure path of a science” for both mathematics and philosophy. Gödel's temporal subjectivism and metaphysical conceptual objectivism are presented as positively or negatively motivated by Kant's viewpoints. A remark on Gödel's collapse of modalities (in accordance with the collapse of objective time) is added.
|Keywords||conceptual objectivism collapse of modalities foundations of mathematics Gödel's philosophy Kant metaphysics temporal subjectivism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Margit Ruffing (2010). Kant-Bibliographie 2008. Kant-Studien 101 (4):487-538.
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