David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthesis Philosophica 14 (1999):45-52 (1999)
Quine rejects intensional Platonism and, with it, also rejects attributes (properties) as designations of predicates. He pragmatically accepts extensional Platonism, but conceives of classes as merely auxiliary entities needed to express some laws of set theory. At the elementary logical level, Quine develops an “ontologically innocent” logic of predicates. What in standard quantification theory is the work of variables is in the logic of predicates the work of a few functors that operate on predicates themselves: variables are eliminated. This “predicate functor logic” may be conceived as a peculiar sort of Platonism - ontologically neutral, reduced to schematized linguistic forms.
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