Some weakened gödelian ontological systems
Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):565-588 (2003)
| Abstract | We describe a KB Gödelian ontological system, and some other weak systems, in a fully formal way using theory of types and natural deduction, and present a completeness proof in its main and specific parts. We technically and philosophically analyze and comment on the systems (mainly with respect to the relativism of values) and include a sketch of some connected aspects of Gödel''s relation to Kant. | |||||||||
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