The return of Taylor's Putnam
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):119 – 125 (2009)
| Abstract | It is argued that the version of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument developed by Barry Taylor in Models, Truth and Realism poses no threat to the realist claim that an ideal theory may be false. | |||||||||
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