David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):275-296 (1996)
In this paper we explore the thesis that the role of argumentation in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular is to justify the use of defeasible rules to derive a conclusion in preference to the use of other defeasible rules to derive a conflicting conclusion. The defeasibility of rules is expressed by means of non-provability claims as additional conditions of the rules.We outline an abstract approach to defeasible reasoning and argumentation which includes many existing formalisms, including default logic, extended logic programming, non-monotonic modal logic and auto-epistemic logic, as special cases. We show, in particular, that the admissibility semantics for all these formalisms has a natural argumentation-theoretic interpretation and proof procedure, which seem to correspond well with informal argumentation.
|Keywords||argumentation default reasoning priority|
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References found in this work BETA
John Pollock (1987). Defeasible Reasoning. Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
H. Prakken & G. Sartor (1996). A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):331-368.
Robert C. Moore (1985). Semantic Considerations on Nonmonotonic Logic. Artificial Intelligence 25:75-94.
Thomas F. Gordon (1993). The Pleadings Game. Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (4):239-292.
Ray Reiter (1980). A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 13:81-137.
Citations of this work BETA
Henry Prakken (2008). Formalising Ordinary Legal Disputes: A Case Study. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (4):333-359.
Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
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