David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 40 (3):549-552 (2012)
Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
|Keywords||Nelson Goodman grue induction Nicod's Criterion confirmation projectibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
Peter Gärdenfors (1990). Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):78-95.
Willard V. Quine (1969). Natural Kinds. In Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press 114-38.
Barry Stroud (2000). Meaning, Understanding, and Practice: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alfred Schramm (2014). Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue. Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
Similar books and articles
Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.
John D. Norton (2006). How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207.
Barry Ward (2012). Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.
Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
Daniel Steel, Mind Changes and Testability: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.
Edward S. Shirley (1981). An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
Rami Israel (2004). Two Interpretations of ‘Grue’– or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction. Analysis 64 (284):335–339.
John Moreland (1976). On Projecting Grue. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
Marc Lange (1994). Earman on the Projectibility of Grue. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:87 - 95.
Added to index2011-08-12
Total downloads216 ( #14,251 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #44,760 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?