Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction

Philosophia 40 (3):549-552 (2012)
Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
Keywords Nelson Goodman  grue  induction  Nicod's Criterion  confirmation  projectibility
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References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1946). A Query on Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
Nelson Goodman (1947). On Infirmities of Confirmation-Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):149-151.

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Barry Ward (2012). Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.
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John Moreland (1976). On Projecting Grue. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
Marc Lange (1994). Earman on the Projectibility of Grue. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:87 - 95.

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