David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Neuroethics 4 (1):51-64 (2011)
This article will examine how the notion of emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and ‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that artificial substances do not necessarily result in inauthentic emotions. The literature provided by the philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement’ provides good reasons to include real world examples. Such case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like themselves’ for the first time in their lives. Beginning with these accounts, this article suggests three non-naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not always the only valid one, but that the other two ways of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the normative implications if not ethical intricacies that accompany the enhancement of emotions
|Keywords||Neuro-enhancement Authenticity Emotions Prozac Naturalness Artificiality|
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References found in this work BETA
Nick Bostrom (2003). Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):493-506.
Ronald de Sousa (2002). Emotional Truth: Ronald de Sousa. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247–263.
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Citations of this work BETA
F. Kraemer (2013). Authenticity or Autonomy? When Deep Brain Stimulation Causes a Dilemma. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):757-760.
Ginger A. Hoffman (2013). Treating Yourself as an Object: Self-Objectification and the Ethical Dimensions of Antidepressant Use. Neuroethics 6 (1):165-178.
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