David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 22 (2):211-234 (2005)
The hypothesis of no prime worlds (NPW) holds that for any possible world x that an omnipotent being has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y , that the omnipotent being could have actualized instead of x . NPW is generally deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do his best in actualizing this world. Sometimes this view is deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do better in actualizing this world. These defences are compelling, and, accordingly, critics of theism have developed new anti-theistic arguments on NPW. Most anti-theistic arguments on this view are a posteriori : they typically hold that a God-actualized world would exhibit (or lack) certain features, and that, since the actual world fails (or seemingly fails) to conform to these expectations, it is reasonable to believe that God does not exist. Since most of these arguments appeal to certain claims about evil, they may be treated as versions of the problem of evil. Such arguments are controversial, and the literature surrounding them is vast
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Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Divine Unsurpassability. Philosophia 35 (3-4):293-300.
Mark Walker (2009). The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God. Sophia 48 (4):351 - 378.
Jeremy Gwiazda (2010). God's Random Selection: Reply to Steinberg. Sophia 49 (1):141-143.
Klaas J. Kraay (2011). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and God's Choice of a World. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2):91 - 102.
David Kyle Johnson (2014). The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World. Sophia 53 (4):447-465.
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