Constraining Premise Sets for Counterfactuals

Journal of Semantics 22 (2):153-158 (2005)
Abstract
This note is a reply to ‘On the Lumping Semantics of Counterfactuals’ by Makoto Kanazawa, Stefan Kaufmann and Stanley Peters. It shows first that the first triviality result obtained by Kanazawa, Kaufmann, and Peters is already ruled out by the constraints on admissible premise sets listed in Kratzer (1989). Second, and more importantly, it points out that the results obtained by Kanazawa, Kaufmann, and Peters are obsolete in view of the revised analysis of counterfactuals in Kratzer (1990, 2002)
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Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.
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