Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge

Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317 (2002)
Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
Keywords A Priori  Epistemology  Externalism  Inclusion  Memory  Self-knowledge  Boghossian, P
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DOI 10.1023/A:1016307111148
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Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605 - 632.

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