Facts: Particulars or information units? [Book Review]

Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):655-670 (2002)
Abstract
What are facts, situations, or events? When Situation Semantics was born in the eighties, I objected because I could not swallow the idea that situations might be chunks of information. For me, they had to be particulars like sticks or bricks. I could not imagine otherwise. The first manuscript of “An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought” that I submitted to Linguistics and Philosophy had a footnote where I distanced myself from all those who took possible situations to be units of information. In that context and at that time, this meant Jon Barwise and John Perry.
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Ana Arregui (2009). On Similarity in Counterfactuals. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):245-278.
Stefan Kaufmann (2013). Causal Premise Semantics. Cognitive Science 37 (6):1136-1170.

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