Facts: Particulars or information units?
Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):655-670 (2002)
| Abstract | What are facts, situations, or events? When Situation Semantics was born in the eighties, I objected because I could not swallow the idea that situations might be chunks of information. For me, they had to be particulars like sticks or bricks. I could not imagine otherwise. The first manuscript of “An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought” that I submitted to Linguistics and Philosophy had a footnote where I distanced myself from all those who took possible situations to be units of information. In that context and at that time, this meant Jon Barwise and John Perry. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and Association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
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Noa Latham (2002). Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
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