Philosophia 31 (1-2):55-74 (2003)
|Abstract||We consider Kaplan's two main theories of demonstrative reference, that it is determined by intention, and that it is determined by a demonstration. The first, though showing genuine insight into the sort of private concerns relevant, is shown to fail due to circularity. The second, though it brings out clearly the more public factors relevant, fails because of vacuity. I advance a new theory, explaining demonstrative reference in terms of the closeness of match of the demonstrative utterance to the facts, given the way the parties concerned are likely to think about it|
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