Identity, indiscernibility, and philosophical claims
| Abstract | The concept of indiscernibility in a structure is analysed with the aim of emphasizing that in asserting that two objects are indiscernible, it is useful to consider these objects as members of (the domain of) a structure. A case for this usefulness is presented by examining the consequences of this view to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory. | |||||||||
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Philip Kremer (1999). Relevant Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):199-222.
Matteo Morganti (2011). Bundles, Individuation and Indiscernibility. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):36-48.
Douglas Odegard (1978). The Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Relativity of Identity. Philosophical Studies 33 (3):313 - 317.
Robert J. Swartz (1972). Identity, Indiscernibility, and Belief. Philosophical Studies 23 (6):410 - 413.
Casey Perin (2005). Academic Arguments for the Indiscernibility Thesis. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):493-517.
Adam Caulton & Jeremy Butterfield (2012). On Kinds of Indiscernibility in Logic and Metaphysics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1):27-84.
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