David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The idea that legal theories seek not only to explain but to evaluate the moral justification of particular areas of law is quite familiar. Yet little attention has been paid to the minimal criteria of adequacy for justificatory legal theories. Whereas many theories claim to identify the moral grounds that justify a particular area of law, such as contracts or torts, none of them explains how its justification determines the outcomes of adjudication governed by the law in that area. In this brief Essay for the William and Mary Law Review Symposium on Law and Morality, I argue that a particular area of law can be justified only by identifying moral reasons that fully determine the results of adjudication. No matter how compelling the moral reasons a legal theory identifies, and how tight the fit between those reasons and the structure and content of the legal rules governing a judicial decision, a legal theory fails to justify a particular area of law if the reasoning it identifies falls short of fully determining the results in the judicial decisions governed by that law. Though this bold claim may seem unrealistic, I argue that legal theories can satisfy this determinacy requirement by identifying determinate but inconclusive reasoning that explains outcomes in adjudication. While such reasoning may prove to be erroneous, that does not undermine its justificatory force
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Amalia Amaya (2011). Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence. Ratio Juris 24 (3):304-329.
Brian Bix (1993). Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Reeves (2011). Judicial Practical Reason: Judges in Morally Imperfect Legal Orders. Law and Philosophy 30 (3):319-352.
Joseph Raz (1979). The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford University Press.
Barbara Baum Levenbook (1984). On Universal Relevance in Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 3 (1):1 - 23.
Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis.
Neil MacCormick (2005). Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov (2011). The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special? Ratio Juris 24 (3):284-303.
Barbara Baum Levenbook (1984). The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy 3 (3):355 - 374.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #162,739 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,207 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?