No better reasons: A reply to Alan Gewirth

Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):131-139 (1998)
Alan Gewirth has propounded a moral theory which commits him to the view that prescriptions can appropriately be addressed to people who have neither any moral reasons nor any prudential reasons to follow the prescriptions. We highlight the strangeness of Gewirth's position and then show that it undermines his attempt to come up with a supreme moral principle
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01747.x
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