The metaphysics of counterpart theory

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):150 – 157 (1980)
The technical apparatus of modal semantics--Possible worlds, World-Lines, Counterparts, Etc.--Continues to arouse suspicion among philosophers of various persuasions. A way to dispel at least some of the suspicion is to provide a naturalistic interpretation of the semantical machinery. My goal here is precisely that. More specifically, I provide a behavioristically acceptable interpretation of david lewis' counterpart theory. Reference to worlds and counterparts is construed in sober, Quinean terms. The result is a "metalinguistic" construal of counterpart semantics, And thus, Of modality. Having shown that counterpart theory rests on no dubious philosophical assumptions, I briefly explore some of the metaphysical consequences of the resulting theory of modality
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DOI 10.1080/00048408012341171
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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Takashi Yagisawa (2008). Modal Realism with Modal Tense 1. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):309-327.
Mark Norris Lance (1984). Reference Without Causation. Philosophical Studies 45 (3):335 - 351.

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