Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse

Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368 (2010)
God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40542560
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1972). Must God Create the Best? Philosophical Review 81 (3):317-332.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jason Megill (2011). Evil and the Many Universes Response. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):127-138.
Klaas J. Kraay (2013). Megill's Multiverse Meta-Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):235-241.

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