David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):344 - 367 (2010)
In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that a model is Thomason when there is no vicious reference in it. We extend their investigation, considering notions of nonpathologicality and senses of "no vicious reference" generated both by revision theories of truth and by fixedpoint theories of truth. We show that some of the fixed-point theories have an advantage analogous to that which Gupta and Belnap claim for their approach, and that at least one revision theory does not. This calls into question the claim that the revision theories have a distinctive advantage in this regard.
|Keywords||Truth Paradox Vicious reference Fixed-point semantics Revision theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Stephen Yablo (1993). Paradox Without Self--Reference. Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Citations of this work BETA
Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer (forthcoming). Conditionals in Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-37.
Stefan Wintein (2014). Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There's No Vicious Reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.
Similar books and articles
Nuel Belnap (2006). Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
Roy T. Cook (2003). Still Counterintuitive: A Reply to Kremer. Analysis 63 (279):257–261.
Nuel D. Belnap (1982). Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
C. M. Asmus (2013). Vagueness and Revision Sequences. Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
Gian Aldo Antonelli (1996). What's in a Function? Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
Philip Kremer (2009). Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363 - 403.
P. D. Welch (2001). On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
Added to index2009-06-19
Total downloads42 ( #96,376 of 1,793,278 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #89,724 of 1,793,278 )
How can I increase my downloads?