David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Papers 39 (1):53-68 (2011)
In this paper, I argue against the standard interpretation of Mill as a hedonistic utilitarian, and argue instead that Mill holds a 'eudaimonic' conception of happiness. I begin by clarifying exactly what I mean by a eudaimonic conception of happiness, and then examine the textual evidence for this eudaimonic interpretation, as well as the evidence against the standard hedonistic interpretation. Naturally, a great deal of the paper will revolve around an analysis of Mill's Utilitarianism , but special attention will also be paid to On Liberty , reading it as a development of Mill's moral theory rather than a mere application of it
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