Online research in philosophy

Since former President Soeharto was forced to resign in 1998, the Indonesian judiciary has been significantly reformed. A Judicial Commission was established to monitor its performance. A Constitutional Court was also created; one of its tasks is to decide disputes between state institutions and to review the constitutionality of statutes. This paper discusses the Constitutional Court case in which several Supreme Court judges alleged that the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial independence precluded the Judicial Commission from supervising the Supreme Court’s performance by critically analysing its decisions. The Constitutional Court accepted this argument, declaring that the Indonesian Constitution prohibited the Judicial Commission from performing this function. This paper discusses this case and its potential ramifications.

The Supreme Court's 2008 decision extending the constitutional right of habeas corpus to non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay is a remarkable decision on many levels. Although the Supreme Court had previously held to a mostly sovereignty based, territorial methodology for determining whether U.S. constitutional rights would be extended extraterritorially, latent in the Court's jurisprudence had long been a strain of the "personal law" principle. That personal law principle was the analytical basis for reorientation of U.S. conflicts law away from territoriality to interest analysis. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court was required to confront the competing territoriality and personal law strands of its jurisprudence. Its attempt to reconcile the two into a "functional" test mimics the same struggle that U.S. courts have had for the last four decades trying to accommodate those competing concerns on conflict of laws. Thus, this article argues that the Supreme Court's decision is best understood as a conflict-of-laws decision.

In a lecture at the University of Chicago, U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted that he has two jobs: the first job, he explained, is deciding what to decide, and the second job is then to decide what the Court has decided to decided. Many devote careers to analyzing and criticizing exactly how Supreme Court Justices perform their second job of deciding the cases the Court has decided to decide; far less attention has been devoted to analyzing and criticizing exactly how Supreme Court Justices perform their first job of deciding what to decide.This commentary directs attention (and criticism) toward the Justices' performance in their first job of deciding what to decide in the arena of criminal justice. This commentary contends the Supreme Court has recently done a poor job setting its own agenda and its failings have had a negative impact on state and federal legal systems. Specifically, the Supreme Court has become caught up in a "culture of death": the Court devotes extraordinarily too much of its scarce time and energy to reviewing death penalty cases and adjudicating the claims of death row defendants. As the title of the commentary is intended to suggest, this phenomenon a "capital waste" that results in various problems for the administration of both capital and non-capital sentencing systems.Beyond criticizing the Supreme Court's troublesome affinity for obsessing over capital cases, this commentary explores under-examined agenda-setting dynamics that shape the Court's engagement with legal issues and its work-product. In addition, as a final coda suggests, changes in Court personnel might prove to be as consequential with regard to how the Court sets its docket as with regard to how the Court resolves cases.

In this paper, I have analyzed the right to trial by jury in civil cases as reflected in decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court over approximately a 20 year period dealing with three areas affecting the right to trial by jury in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury trial; (2) summary disposition; and (3) directed verdicts. The study was constructed to cover cases over a substantial period of time, so that it would be possible to analyze whether the changing composition of the Michigan Supreme Court, beginning in the late 1990's, impacted on the Court's decisions in these three areas.The conclusion that emerges from the is that the Court, as currently constituted, has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. The Court is more inclined than it was prior to 1999 to hold in more cases that there is no genuine issue of material fact, justifying summary disposition, and has now heard cases in which it has held that the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. And the fact that the Court is more inclined to uphold the granting of summary disposition and directed verdicts is likely to have a demonstrable impact on these kinds cases when they are presented to the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. These courts, following the precedents of the Supreme Court and the results of the cases coming before that Court, will be more likely to rule in favor of granting motions for summary disposition and motions for directed verdicts.Given the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury in resolving factual disputes in civil cases, litigating lawyers must make the best of a bad situation and do everything that they can in order to protect the right to trial by jury in civil cases. They must try to ensure in the early stages of the litigation that their cases are strong enough to survive a motion for summary disposition and get to the jury, and at the trial they must make a determined effort to present sufficient evidence to survive a directed verdict. Hopefully the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury will not have dealt a fatal blow to the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Time will tell how well the lawyers of Michigan have succeeded in preserving this fundamental constitutional right.

Recent critics of the Roberts Court chide it for its lack of regard for precedent. Fred Schauer faults these critics for erroneously assuming that a rule of stare decisis formerly played a significant role in the Supreme Court's decision-making. In fact, it has long played only a rare and weak role in the Court's work. Nonetheless, according to Schauer, the critics are to be thanked for invigorating a needed debate about the importance of "stability, consistency, settlement, reliance, notice, and predictability" in the Court's decisions. This article argues that Schauer exaggerates the weakness of stare decisis in the Court's practices; and that his call for a public debate on the merits of the norm of stare decisis can only weaken it.

The Indian Supreme Court has invited a great deal of interest for its alleged activism and the role which it has begun to play in Indian governance. Recent years have been witness to substantial debate on the Court’s functioning, with scholars positing views and raising concerns with considerable passion. This paper analyzes the judicial activism discourse in the Indian Supreme Court by focusing on the contributions of Professor Upendra Baxi. It argues that despite the attention the Court has received on the question of judicial activism, the debate in this area has, for the large part, failed to engage with the meaning of the term “judicial activism” and examine the manner in which it is determined. This paper contends that a recent model to measure judicial activism proposed by Cohn and Kremnitzer can fill this void. It applies the model to three major cases of the Indian Supreme Court, to demonstrate how it can enable us to arrive at a sophisticated understanding of when decisions are activist; and how decisions may be activist by some parameters and restrained by others. In particular, it illustrates that commentary on the Court needs to evolve and engage with judicial decision-making in a far more rigorous fashion. Through its qualitative analysis, this paper suggests that the Cohn-Kremnitzer model can play an important role in moving beyond the current impasse in the debates on judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court.

This article is part of a special Supreme Court issue of Engage, a journal published by the Federalist Society. It argues that communications law and policy would be much different today - and more suited to the now generally competitive and converging communications marketplace - if the Supreme Court's twentieth century jurisprudence had been different. While discussing the Court's acceptance of the Communications Act's ubiquitous "public interest" standard against nondelegation doctrine challenges, the article focuses more on the Court's leading First Amendment communications law cases, where jurisprudential change is more likely to come. The essay concludes: "With the revisiting of Red Lion, Pacifica, and Turner along the lines discussed above, the Court can establish a new First Amendment paradigm for the electronic media, one that, I would argue, is much more in keeping with the Founders' First Amendment vision. Perhaps it was predictable, maybe even likely, that the First Amendment's protections would be limited substantially during an analog age that tended towards a monopolistic or oligopolistic communications marketplace. But it should be considered predictable, and, yes, even likely, for the Court now to establish a new First Amendment jurisprudence befitting the media abundance of the digital age.".

This article is intended to provide an overview of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on private international law. It will discuss several cases that have been brought to the Supreme Court over the past few terms, and will utilize these cases as a lens through which to view the movement of the Court toward or away from an increased awareness of and international consensus on private international law issues. Interspersed throughout this discussion will be mention of other issues of private international law that may be brought before the Court in the future. The article concludes that while the Court has embraced its role in defining the extraterritorial reach of federal laws, bringing about much needed predictability for international sovereign and private interests, it has separately continued to defer questions of personal jurisdiction to the authority of lower federal and state courts with little regard for internal (and international) harmony.

The way in which the Supreme Court of Canada deals with politically controversial cases suggests that the Court is self-defining of its role in constitutional litigation, and more broadly in the constitutional order. Recent litigation involving same-sex marriage and the public health care system demonstrates the problem. In the context of same-sex marriage, the Court had no choice but to hear a reference from the government of Canada seeking advice, yet the Court purported to exercise a discretionary power not to answer the most important question before it: whether or not limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples infringed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In the context of the public health care system, the Court had a choice, and it chose to hear an appeal on the constitutionality of Quebec legislation designed to protect the public monopoly on heath care. Having elected to hear that case, however, the Court failed to reach a majority decision on the Charter question, and the failure appears to have been deliberate. Having deprecated the "passive virtues" and rejected a political questions doctrine, the Supreme Court of Canada nevertheless exercises considerable discretion in dealing with politically controversial cases. It is concerned, among other things, with preserving its political capital in the context of a constitutional order that has become increasingly dependent on its decisions.