David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philip Kremer, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University Note: The following version of this paper does not contain the proofs of the stated theorems. A longer version, complete with proofs, is forthcoming. §1. Introduction. In "The truth is never simple" (1986) and its addendum (1988), Burgess conducts a breathtakingly comprehensive survey of the complexity of the set of truths which arise when you add a truth predicate to arithmetic, and interpret that predicate according to the fixed point semantics or the revision-theoretic semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Burgess considers various sets that can be said to represent truth in this context, and shows that their complexity ranges from Π11 or Σ11 to Π12 or Σ12. Thus, enriching arithmetic with a truth predicate increases its complexity, which is otherwise only ∆11.
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