David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness & Cognition 16 (4):897-912 (2007)
b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations.
|Keywords||consciousness neural correlates of consciousness|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jakob Hohwy (2009). The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: New Experimental Approaches Needed? Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):428-438.
Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Andy D. Mealor & Zoltan Dienes (2013). The Speed of Metacognition: Taking Time to Get to Know One's Structural Knowledge. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):123-136.
Andy Mealor & Zoltan Dienes (2012). No-Loss Gambling Shows the Speed of the Unconscious. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):228-237.
Ben Phillips (2014). Indirect Representation and the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
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