Philosophical Studies:1-12 (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Consider the following argument: When a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena – certain conscious experiences – are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy that its indispensability for a genuine understanding of the mind only shows that no genuine understanding of the mind is possible|
|Keywords||Introspection Phenomenology Cognitive science Context of discovery Context of justification|
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