A hesitant defense of introspection

Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1165-1176 (2013)
Consider the following argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena—certain conscious experiences—are introspectively observable; so, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations of conscious experiences. This paper offers a (preliminary and partial) defense of this line of thought. Much of the paper focuses on a specific challenge to it, which I call Schwitzgebel’s Challenge: the claim that introspection is so untrustworthy that its indispensability for a genuine understanding of the mind only shows that no genuine understanding of the mind is possible
Keywords Introspection  Phenomenology  Cognitive science  Context of discovery  Context of justification
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0148-0
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References found in this work BETA
Julia Annas (2008). The Phenomenology of Virtue. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rik Peels (2016). The Empirical Case Against Introspection. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.

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Ksenija Puškarić (2005). Rey and the Projectivist Account. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):441-445.
Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.

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