Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132 (2003)
| Abstract | The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano | |||||||||
| Keywords | Consciousness Metaphysics Self-consciousness Aristotle Brentano | |||||||||
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