David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132 (2003)
The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Self-consciousness Aristotle Brentano|
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Evan Thompson (2005). Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.
Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
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