David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The Monist 87 (2):182-205 (2004)
In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for denying the dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness apply only to transitive self-consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Intransitivity Metaphysics Self-consciousness Transitivity|
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Citations of this work BETA
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Alexandre Billon (2015). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Luciano Floridi (2005). Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game. Minds and Machines 15 (3):415-444.
Uriah Kriegel (2007). The Phenomenologically Manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.
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