Comparativist Philosophy of Science and Population Viability Assessment in Biology: Helping Resolve Scientific Controversy
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 73 (5):817-828 (2006)
Comparing alternative scientific theories obviously is relevant to theory assessment, but are comparativists (like Laudan) correct when they also make it necessary? This paper argues that they are not. Defining rationality solely in terms of theories' comparative problem-solving strengths, comparativist philosophers of science like Laudan subscribe to what I call the irrelevance claim (IC) and the necessity claim (NC). According to IC, a scientific theory's being well or poorly confirmed is "irrelevant" to its acceptance; NC is the claim that "all evaluations of research traditions and theories must be made within a comparative context," how any theory "compares with its competitors" (Laudan 1977, 21, 120). Using current competing theories (T1 and T2) of population viability assessment (PVA) for the Florida panther, the paper investigates IC/NC. In part because dominant T2 panther biologists accept IC/NC (which T1 theorists reject), the paper argues that they appear both to have accepted flawed T2 and to have contributed to flawed panther science and policy. Correcting Laudan's Comparativist Philosophy of Science (LCPS), underlying the T1-versus-T2 debate, thus may hold promise for helping resolve both the scientific and policy controversy over panther PVA.
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References found in this work BETA
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Deborah G. Mayo (2001). Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Larry Laudan (1997). How About Bust? Factoring Explanatory Power Back Into Theory Evaluation. Philosophy of Science 64 (2):306-316.
Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Elliott & Daniel McKaughan (2009). How Values in Scientific Discovery and Pursuit Alter Theory Appraisal. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):598-611.
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