Irrevocable Belief Revision in Dynamic Doxastic Logic

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39 (3):287-306 (1998)
In this paper we present a new modeling for belief revision that is what we term irrevocable. This modeling is of philosophical interest since it captures some features of suppositional reasoning, and of formal interest since it is closely connected with AGM, yet provides for iterated belief revision. The analysis is couched in terms of dynamic doxastic logic
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DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1039182247
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Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.

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Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
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