Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues

In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction
Keywords Moral phenomenology  First-person perspective  Meta-ethics  Normative ethics  Cognitive science
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9057-z
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Uriah Kriegel (2007). The Phenomenologically Manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.
Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.

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