Naturalizing Subjective Character

Abstract
Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.
Keywords Character  Conscious  Experience  Metaphysics  Subjective
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References found in this work BETA
Richard E. Aquila (1990). Philosophical Abstracts. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1).
George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69 - 117.

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